The Supreme Court’s discussion of this issue serves as a reminder to litigants facing a motion under Rule 60(b) to closely examine the nature of the relief sought and whether a court has jurisdiction to grant it.

On February 26, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., unanimously held that voluntary dismissals constitute final orders under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This paves the way for federal courts to reopen previously dismissed claims, even when the statute of limitations has run on them.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)

By way of background, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits federal courts to grant parties relief from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” for several enumerated reasons. This includes, among other things, a party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or even excusable neglect. Other reasons include newly discovered evidence; fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; or any other reason that justifies relief. The general purpose of the rule is to make an exception to finality when it is necessary for the purposes of justice.

The Issue Decided in Waetzig

The issue before the Supreme Court in Waetzig was whether Rule 60(b)’s finality requirement merely means that a case has come to an end or whether—similar to what is required to confer jurisdiction upon federal appellate courts—it means the termination of a case on its merits. Ultimately, the Court decided that finality requires only that a case has come to an end.

The Court reached this holding based upon the history of Rule 60(b), which derived from a California Rule of Civil Procedure. As the Supreme Court noted, California case law interpreting California law, held that prejudice was not required to reopen a previously dismissed case. Accordingly, the Court held that the same must be true for Rule 60(b).

The Supreme Court also looked at the definition of “final” in legal dictionaries from the first year the word “final” appeared in the Rule 60(b). At that time, “final” was defined to mean “[d]efinitive; terminating; completed; conclusive; last.” The Court held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice comfortably falls into this definition because it concludes or terminates the lawsuit. Thus, a voluntary dismissal also comfortably falls within the ambit of Rule 60(b).

The Court’s ruling opens the door for the petitioner Gary Waetzig to reinstate his age-discrimination lawsuit against his former employer, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Waetzig had voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a), so that his claims could be submitted to binding arbitration. Because this was the first dismissal of Waetzig’s suit, it was deemed without prejudice.

Waetzig ultimately lost the arbitration at the summary judgment stage of proceedings. However, instead of filing a new lawsuit attacking the validity of the arbitration award, he filed a motion under the prior docket, asking for his district court case to be reopened pursuant to Rule 60(b) and for the arbitration award to be vacated.

The trial court granted Waetzig the requested relief. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that Waetzig’s prior dismissal was not a final order because it required neither the entry of judgment nor an order of the court.

In reversing the Tenth Circuit for the reasons discussed above, the Supreme Court was careful to narrowly limit the scope of its opinion solely to the issue of whether a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal without prejudice constitutes a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b). The Supreme Court was careful to state that it expressed no opinion about whether the trial court properly reopened Waetzig’s case pursuant to Rule 60(b) or whether doing so also conferred the trial court with jurisdiction to vacate the arbitration award. The Supreme Court left both issues to be decided on remand.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court seemed to suggest that the trial court might have overstepped its authority. In dicta, the Supreme Court addressed its holdings in two prior cases, Badgerow and Kokkonen. In Badgerow, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act does not, on its own, vest the federal courts with jurisdiction to vacate arbitration awards. There must be an independent jurisdictional basis to do so. And, in Kokkonen, the Court held that Rule 60(b) also cannot serve as an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Hence, unless there is another basis to support the trial court jurisdiction over Waetzig’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, the trial court’s ruling may not stand.

The Supreme Court’s discussion of this issue serves as a reminder to litigants facing a motion under Rule 60(b) to closely examine the nature of the relief sought and whether a court has jurisdiction to grant it.

Implications

The Court’s decision, extending Rule 60(b)’s applicability to reopening voluntarily dismissed suits, has the potential to revive cases long after the statute of limitations has run. As a result, defendants may never truly know peace when a claim is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

Another concern relates to the potential loss of evidence between the time a case is voluntarily dismissed and a Rule 60(b) motion. During this time, a defendant’s preservation efforts may have ceased, and the memories of witnesses may have faded. In this regard, the Supreme Court did not address the defense of laches and the prejudice caused by a plaintiff’s undue delay. However, such defenses may surely come into play in the right circumstances.

In short, the Supreme Court’s decision is likely to lead to many more motions to reopen previously dismissed cases. Creative approaches will be required to defend against them.

For More Information

If you have any questions about this Alert, please contact Sharon L. Caffrey, Jeffrey S. Pollack, Katie Kovalsky, any of the attorneys in our Trial Practice Group or the attorney in the firm with whom you are regularly in contact. 

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